Canadian Monetary Policy: Lessons from the Crisis by Angelo Melino
 
 
Copyright belongs to the author. Small sections of the text, not exceeding three paragraphs, can be used 
provided proper acknowledgement is given.  
 
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) was established in March 2007. RCEA is a private, 
nonprofit organization dedicated to independent research in Applied and Theoretical Economics and related 
fields. RCEA organizes seminars and workshops, sponsors a general interest journal The Review of 
Economic Analysis, and organizes a biennial conference: The Rimini Conference in Economics and Finance 
(RCEF) . The RCEA has a Canadian branch: The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in Canada (RCEA-
Canada). Scientific work contributed by the RCEA Scholars is published in the RCEA Working Papers and 
Professional Report series. 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to 
the Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis. 
 
 
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis  
Legal address: Via Angherà, 22 – Head office: Via Patara, 3 - 47900 Rimini (RN) – Italy 











University of Toronto 
and 




CANADIAN MONETARY POLICY:  
LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS 
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•  Evidence suggests its specific nature made the conditional commitment more effective.   •  Other unconventional tools, such as credit and quantitative easing, were shown to be 
effective elsewhere.  Announcement and subsequent purchases of MBS by the Fed helped 
lower the cost of 30‐yr fixed mortgages.  Quantitative easing in the UK helped push down 
yield on 10‐yr bonds. 
•  Bottom‐line: the Bank retains considerable flexibility at the zero‐bound  
4.  Outstanding Monetary Policy Issues Related to the Crisis 
Three main questions have emerged or resurfaced 
(1)  What is the optimum level of inflation? 
(2)  What advantages might price‐level targeting offer? 
(3)  Should monetary policy give more recognition to financial stability goals? 
 
 